It was a momentous day for the Indian legal system when Justice D.Y. Chandrachud was appointed as the Chief Justice of India in After having served as a judge for the Supreme Court of India for nine years, Justice Chandrachud was ready to take on the highest office in the country’s judiciary.
Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud (born 11 November 1959) is an Indian judge who is serving as the 50th and current Chief Justice of India.
He is a former ex-officio executive chairman of National Legal Services Authority whilst being Judge (or the senior-most judge after the chief justice) of the Supreme Court of India. In addition, he is a former chief justice of the Allahabad High Court and a former judge of the Bombay High Court. Son of India’s longest-serving Chief Justice, Y. V. Chandrachud, he was educated at Delhi University and Harvard University before practising for Sullivan & Cromwell and in Bombay High Court.
He became a judge at the Bombay High Court and then the chief justice of Allahabad High Court.He has been part of benches that delivered landmark judgments such as the Ram Janmabhoomi verdict, Privacy verdict, decriminalization of homosexuality and Sabarimala case.
He has visited the universities of Mumbai, Oklahoma, Harvard, Yale and others as a professor. Chandrachud studied law at Delhi University in 1982 at a time when few jobs were available to young law graduates. He worked for a while, as a junior advocate assisting lawyers and judges, including drafting some briefs for Fali Nariman. After graduating from Harvard, Chandrachud first worked at the law firm Sullivan and Cromwell. He described this experience as “sheer fluke” due to the strong pecking order that existed at that time, and a strong bias against hiring Indians and similar developing countries.
Upon returning to India, he practised law at the Supreme Court of India and the Bombay High Court. He was designated a Senior Advocate by the Bombay High Court in June 1998.
That year, he was appointed an Additional Solicitor General of India, a role he held until his appointment as a Judge.He became a judge at the Bombay High Court from 29 March 2000 until his appointment as Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court. During this time, he was also Director of the Maharashtra Judicial Academy.
He was chief justice of the Allahabad High Court from 31 October 2013 until appointment to the Supreme Court of India on 13 May 2016.
From 24 April 2021 onwards, he became a part of the Collegium of the Supreme Court of India, which is a body composed of the five senior-most judges of the Supreme Court of India and is responsible for the appointment of judges in the Supreme Court of India and all the High Courts.
He is the executive chairman of National Legal Services Authority.
On 17 October 2022, he was appointed as chief justice of India after the retirement of then chief justice, Uday Umesh Lalit. He was sworn in as the 50th chief justice of India on 9 November 2022.During his Supreme Court service, he has been on the highest number of constitution benches (five judges or more) constituted to hear matters on constitutional questions.
Among his notable judgments is his lead opinion in Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. vs Union Of India And Ors. as part of a unanimous nine-judge bench decision of the Indian Supreme Court, which affirmed that the right to privacy is a constitutionally guaranteed right.
Chandrachud grounded the right to privacy in dignity, liberty, autonomy, bodily and mental integrity, self-determination and across a spectrum of protected rights. Writing for himself and three other judges, he stated: Dignity cannot exist without privacy. Both reside within the inalienable values of life, liberty and freedom which the Constitution has recognised. Privacy is the ultimate expression of the sanctity of the individual. It is a constitutional value which straddles across the spectrum of fundamental rights and protects for the individual a zone of choice and self-determination.
In 2013, a two judge bench of the Supreme Court of India in Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation upheld Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code which criminalized homosexuality He observed that the decision was wrong as “the purpose of elevating certain rights to the stature of guaranteed fundamental rights is to insulate their exercise from the disdain of majorities, whether legislative or popular.” He concluded by disagreeing “with the manner in which Koushal has dealt with the privacy – dignity-based claims of LGBT persons” and held that: this judgment declared Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code unconstitutional.
He is also known for expressly overruling the ADM Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla (Habeas Corpus) case in which the lead opinion was written by his father – former chief justice of India Y. V. Chandrachud. Justice D Y Chandrachud has termed dissent as the safety valve of democracy.
He has authored judgments upholding the right to the freedom of speech in numerous cases. In Indibility Creative Pvt Ltd v State of West Bengal, he authored a judgment which imposed a fine on the State of West Bengal and granted remedial compensation for disallowing the screening of the political satire Bhobishyoter Bhoot through extra-constitutional measures. The Court had, by an interim order, directed that there must be no bar on the screening of the movie. In the final judgment, Chandrachud held that even if there was any apprehension of public discontent, police protection must be provided instead of prohibiting the display of the movie.
In Romila Thapar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors, Chandrachud dissented with the majority which refused to constitute a Special Investigation Team to probe the case concerning the arrest of five activists in connection with the 2018 Bhima Koregaon violence and held that in light of the particular circumstances of the case, the constitution of a Special Investigation Team was necessary to ensure a fair and impartial investigation.
In Chief Election Commissioner of India v. M.R. Vijayabhaskar, Chandrachud upheld the freedom of speech and expression of the media in reporting court proceedings. In this case, the Election Commission of India sought restraint on the media from reporting oral observations of judges. The plea came in the context of media reports carrying observation of judges of the Madras High Court stating that the Election Commission was responsible for the second wave of COVID-19 pandemic in the country for allowing political parties to hold massive rallies without adhering to the COVID-19 protocols. Dismissing the plea, the Supreme Court held that the plea by the Election Commission “strikes at the two fundamental principles guaranteed under the Constitution – open court proceedings; and the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression.” The Court also recognised that reporting of judicial proceedings on social media is an extension of freedom of speech and expression that the media possesses.In the suo motu writ petition dealing with the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, Chandrachud criticized certain State Governments for clamping down on free speech of citizens when they sought help for resources online. During the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, many Indians resorted to social media websites to source medical aid – procure oxygen, essential drugs or locate a hospital bed. State Governments in a bid to control the information on the abysmal state of healthcare system in their territories started registering police complaints against persons for posting pleas of help by stating that these were fake and were a bid to create panic and diminish the national image.
Coming down harshly against such tactics in open court, Chandrachud remarked that there could be no clampdown on free flow of information, especially during a humanitarian crisis. The Supreme Court’s order directed all Director Generals of Police to note that any such direct or indirect threats of prosecution or arrest against persons who air their grievances will amount to a contempt of court and invite penal action.
Justice Chandrachud authored the judgment through which bail was granted to Arnab Goswami, the Editor In-Chief of Republic TV, who had been arrested by the Mumbai police in connection with a suicide of an individual and his mother, who claimed that Goswami had not paid him money which was owed for certain contract work. Through his judgment, Chandrachud noted that the High Court of Bombay had failed to prima facie evaluate whether a case of abetment of suicide was made against Goswami. Finding that prima facie no such offence was made out from the facts of the matter, the Supreme Court held that he would be entitled to bail.
In an important section on “Human liberty and the role of Court”, Chandrachud noted that it was important to ensure that criminal law did not become a tool for selective harassment of citizens. Underscoring the importance of bail, the Court held: “More than four decades ago, in a celebrated judgment in State of Rajasthan, Jaipur vs Balchand, Justice Krishna Iyer pithily reminded us that the basic rule of our criminal justice system is “bail, not jail’.
In another case of Rahna Jalal v. State of Kerala, Chandrachud dealt with the question of whether anticipatory bail can be granted to a person (Muslim man) accused of the offence of pronouncement of triple talaq to his wife, punishable under Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019.
Section 7(c) of the said Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, no person accused of this offence would be granted bail, unless the Magistrate has heard the Muslim woman and is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for granting bail to the accused. The State of Kerala argued that the non-obstante clause in Section 7(c) barred the courts from exercising their powers under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to grant anticipatory bail.Rejecting this argument, Chandrachud observed that the right to personal liberty and the grant of bail is a recognition of presumption of innocence where a trial is yet to take place. Given the value of personal liberty, in the absence of an express bar by the Legislature making the provisions of Section 438 inapplicable, no such bar can be presumed. It was further reiterated that a statutory exclusion of the right to access remedies for bail is to be construed strictly.
In Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, he authored a concurring judgment holding that the practice of prohibiting women of menstruating age from entering the Sabarimala temple was discriminatory and violated the fundamental rights of women. In his judgment, he highlighted that “the individual right to the freedom of religion was not intended to prevail over but was subject to the overriding constitutional postulates of equality, liberty and personal freedoms recognised in the other provisions of Part III.”
In Joseph Shine v Union of India he authored a concurring judgment declaring Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code which concerned the adultery law in India unconstitutional. this case was the second case where Chandrachud overruled a decision of his father, former Chief Justice of India Y. V. Chandrachud.
In The Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya he directed the government to consider all woman officers in the Army appointed on Short Service Commissions for the grant of Permanent Commissions on an equal basis with their male counterparts.
After Babita Puniya, he authored the judgment in Union of India v Ld. Cdr. Annie Nagaraja wherein the Court directed a similar relief to be granted to women sailors in the Indian Navy.
On April 27, 2021, he authored a judgement which considered caste and the disability of the woman as a relevant factor in sentencing of the accused for the offence of rape. The judgement further held that a true reading of the SC & ST Act, 1989 shows that it will be attracted to a criminal offence as long as caste identity is one of the grounds for the occurrence of the offence.
This was an important intervention since certain earlier Supreme Court cases had held that a SC & ST Act would only be attracted if the crime was committed solely on the ground that the victim belonged to the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community.
Chandrachud was a part of the seven-judge bench in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, which concerned the re-promulgation of ordinances. The enduring rights theory, according to which the rights and liabilities accrued by virtue of an ordinance were said to have an enduring effect even after the expiration of the ordinance was held bad in law.
Chandrachud writing for the majority held that the rights and liabilities accrued during the force of the ordinance would continue to exist even after the expiration of the ordinance only in public interest or on the basis of constitutional necessity and that ‘irreversibility’ and ‘impracticability’ are the yardsticks to determine what constitutes ‘public interest.
Justice Chandrachud was part of the constitution bench in National Capital Territory v. Union of India, in which the nature of power of the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi vis-à-vis the Government of Delhi was decided. The majority unanimously observed that the Chief Minister, not the Lieutenant Governor, is the executive head of the territory and that the Lieutenant Governor had no independent decision-making power, save and except as provided by the Constitution in exceptional situations.
It was observed that he had to follow the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except when the matter was related to police, public order and land.
It was also held that by virtue of Article 239AA(4) of the Indian Constitution, the Lieutenant Governor could, in the case of any disagreement between the Delhi Government and the Lieutenant Governor, refer ‘exceptional’ matters to the President seeking his opinion. In such cases, the decision of the President would be final. Chandrachud’s concurring opinion which was commented upon for its clarity and nuance, held that an ‘exceptional matter’ is one in which “the Government of the NCT is likely to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union Government.
Justice Chandrachud authored a judgment with far reaching consequences in the political sphere in Shivraj Singh Chouhan. v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Justice Chandrachud held that the Governor’s exercise of power to convene the legislative assembly for a floor test during an ongoing session of the assembly was “legitimate to the purpose of ensuring that the norm of collective responsibility is duly preserved”. He accepted the submission that the Governor commands the power to order a floor test if the Governor has – based on “objective material” – reasons to believe that the government has lost its majority.
Justice Chandrachud authored a judgment in The State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Limited, where at issue was a notification issued by the State of Jharkhand under which the electricity rebate under the Industrial Policy of 2012 was granted only from 2015 onwards. While the High Court of Jharkhand had struck down the notification based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, Supreme Court’s judgment, through an analysis of English and Indian law, clarified that its basis would instead be the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
The Court held that the doctrine of legitimate expectations was one of the ways in which the guarantee of non-arbitrariness enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India finds concrete expression.
During the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in India in April 2021, a bench of the Supreme Court of India headed by the then Chief Justice SA Bobde, Justice LN Rao and Justice S Ravindra Bhat, took suo motu cognizance of the situation in the country to deal with issues pertaining to availability of oxygen supply, essential drugs and modalities for vaccination. After the retirement of Chief Justice Bobde on 23 April 2021, the bench composition was altered with Chandrachud replacing Chief Justice Bobde.Through a series of directions, the Supreme Court directed the Union Government to formulate a national hospital admission policy to ensure no person is denied medical aid on grounds of non-residency in a particular State and raised concerns regarding the augmentation of medical oxygen available and steps taken by the Government. Pertinently, the Supreme Court had made critical observations on the Liberalised Vaccination Policy of the Government of India and noted that the vaccination policy of free vaccination for persons above the age of 45 and paid vaccination for persons between 18 and 44 years was prima facie arbitrary and irrational.
A week after the Supreme court order, the Narendra Modi led Government revised its vaccination policy, centralising its procurement and providing free vaccination to all adults, including between ages 18–44 years.